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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 702: TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge. skill.
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or othervise. I
Rule 702 allows properly qualified experts to testify. in the

form of opinions or dissertations on a particular subject, in order
to assist the trier of fact in evaluating difficult scientific, technical
or other specialized evidence.2 Under Rule 702, a witness can be

qualified as an expert if he or she possesses "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge" gained through "knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education." 3 Thus, -[w]here an

expert has the education or background to permit him to analyze
a given set of circumstances, 'he can through reading.
calculations, and reasoning from known scientific principles
make himself very much an expert ... even though he has not
had actual experience. . . "4 Moreover, courts have recognized

that when determining whether a witness should be qualified as
1. FED. R. Evin. 702.
2. FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note.
3. FED. R. EvID. 702.

4. Lappe v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 222, 226-27
(N.D.N.Y. 1994). In this products liability action arising out of an automobile
accident which left plaintiff driver permanently quadriplegic, the court certified
Dr. James Pugh, as an expert witness qualified to testify as to the design of the
automobile in question. Id. at 224, 226. The court determined that
Although [Dr. Pugh] does not design automobiles for a living, this
expert is a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of New York.
and holds degrees in metallurgy & material science and biomedical
engineering. He is also a member of several professional societies.
Since plaintiff's expert has experience in accident reconstruction and
analysis of vehicular accidents, he clearly "possess[es] skill or
knowledge greater than the average layman" regarding the matter before
this court.
Id. at 227 (citations omitted). Thus, the court qualified Dr. Pugh as an expert
witness under Rule 702 "on the basis of his credentials and experience." Id. at
227.
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an expert, a certain degree of "liberality and flexibility" should
be employed. 5 However, an expert is subject to certain
limitations, therefore, his or her testimony must "stay within the
confines of [the expert's] subject area, and [the expert] cannot
render [an] expert opinion on an entirely different field or
6
discipline."
Upon determining that a witness possesses the necessary
credentials to qualify as an expert under Rule 702, there is a
further inquiry which must be considered. This inquiry must
determine whether the expert's testimony will "aid the trier of
fact in his search for the truth" so as to be rendered admissible. 7
It has been held that where there are questions concerning the
helpfulness of expert testimony to a trier of fact, these should be
answered "in favor of admissibility. "8 In Lappe v. American
Honda Motor Co.,9 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, after qualifying a witness as an
expert, determined that since the facts involved in the products
liability case were of a technical nature, "[t]he expert's reports
and testimony would assist the trier of fact in its determination of
whether plaintiff's 1984 Honda Civic had a substandard
design ... [and] whether such a design contributed, in any way

5. Id. at 227.
6. Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
7. Id. at 226 (citations omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 118
F.R.D. 316, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that testimony of an expert witness
concerning the methodology of organized crime should be allowed in to assist
the trier of fact because the "average jury ... is likely to know very little
about the methods of operation of organized crime ...[and iun order to
conduct a trial it is necessary that the trier of fact ha[ve] a great deal of
familiarity with the way the relevant institution or organization operates"); But
compare, Boyles v. American Cyanamid Company, 796 F, Supp. 704,709
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the testimony of two expert witnesses
concerning the causal relationship between the birth defect of a child and
chemical exposure of the birth mother, amounted to bare conclusory
allegations ...

lacking the indicia of reliability that would cause it to assist a

trier of fact").
8. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1267,
1279 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See also, Lappe, 857 F. Supp. at 226.
9. 857 F. Supp. 222 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). See also supra note 2.
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to plaintiff's accident and injuries."10 Therefore, as exemplified
in Lappe, an expert witness is a witness capable of "draw[ing]
inferences from the facts which a jury would not be competent to
draw." 11
Once a witness is qualified to testify as an expert and the expert

testimony is conducive to aiding a trier of fact; the court must
look at the content of such testimony to determine its
admissibility. 1 2 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the admissibility of expert testimony in many federal

courts was governed by the "general acceptance" test set forth in
Frye v. United States. 13 The Frye test required expert testimony
based on scientific principles or practices to be "generally
accepted" within the relevant and specific field of study in order
to be admissible. 14 Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules

10. Id. at 226.
11. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 13 at 21 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992). In fact, even if a jury would be competent to draw inferences from
the facts, the language embodied in Rule 702 allows testimony of an expert
witness as to specialized knowledge if it will be helpful to a jury to determine a
fact in issue or understand the evidence already presented. Id.
12. Id. "There is also the question of whether opinion evidence is
admissible if the court believes that the state of the pertinent are or scientific
knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an
expert." Id.
13. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See JACK. B. WENSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1j702[03], at 43 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 1995). Although Frye was a decision made in the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and therefore did not have precedential
value in other districts, the standard it pronounced was adopted by many other
federal courts. See KENNETH S. BEOUN. ET. AL.. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

363 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992).
14. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. According to the Frye test:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult
to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
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in 1975, courts have questioned whether Rule 702 incorporated
the Frye test or whether Rule 702 superseded the Frye test.15
This question was answered in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,16 where the Supreme Court held that
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 superseded the Frye test. 17 The

Court stated that the basic thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence
is liberal, whereas the "general acceptance" standard is rigid, and
thus, the two are incompatible. 18 The Court put forth a new
established to have gained general
particular field in which it belongs.

acceptance

in the

Id.
15. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 30, 702[03], at 44-45. After
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Sixth, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, as well as the District of Columbia Circuit, continued to use
the Frye standard, the Fourth and the Eighth Circuits did not use the
"generally accepted" standard of Frye, while both the Second and the Third
Circuits used Frye in some cases but refused to use it in others. See
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 1 702[03], at 44-45, nn. 5-7.
16. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). On behalf of two infant children, their
guardians ad litem brought suit against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to
recover for limb reduction birth defects allegedly sustained, to the children, as
a result of the mother's prenatal ingestion of an anti-nausea drug known as
Benedictin. Id. at 2789. Petitioners sought to proffer evidence in the form ol
testimony from eight experts, each of whom concluded that Benedictin can
cause birth defects. Id. at 2789-90. The trial court and court of appeals
determined that such evidence did not meet the applicable "general
acceptance" standard as enunciated in Frye for the admission of expert
testimony since the expert testimony was not "based on scientific technique(sl
that were 'generally accepted' as reliable in the relevant scientific
community." Id. at 2790. However, the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony in a federal trial. Id. at 2794. Therefore, "under the Rules
the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 2795. The Supreme Court
remanded the case for further proceedings using the correct standard outlined
in Rule 702. Id. at 2799.
17. Id. at 2793.
18. Id. at 2794. Frye is said to be rigid in that "the proponent of the
evidence must prove general acceptance, by surveying scientific publications,
judicial decisions, or practical applications, or by presenting testimony from
scientists as to the attitudes of their fellow scientists." MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 30, at 363.
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standard which required that any scientific testimony or evidence
must be both relevant and reliable in order to be admissible. 19
In Daubert, the Supreme Court set forth a number of
considerations for determining the admissibility of expert
testimony at the trial level. 20 First, the trial court should
determine whether the expert testimony or evidence sought to be
admitted can be and has been tested. 2 1 Second, an inquiry should
be made as to whether the testimony has been subjected to peer
review and publication. 2 2 Third, the court should consider the
known or potential rate of error of the test or technique sought to
be admitted. 23 Finally. the court may evaluate whether the
content of the testimony is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community pursuant to the Fry.'e test. 24 Thus. whereas
the Fiye general acceptance test was at one time the controlling
factor in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, itis
now just one of several factors to be considered under Rule
702.25
When such expert testimony is sought to be introduced, the
trial judge must act as a "gatekeeper" for determining whether
evidence is relevant and reliable. 26 Acting in this capacity, the
trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), 27 must make a "preliminary
19. Id. While acknowledging that Rule 702 applies to -technical or other
specialized knowledge," the Court limited its holding to scientific knowledge.
Id. n.8.

20. Id. at 2796-97. The factors which the Court enumerates are illustrative
and not an exclusive list. Id. at 2797 n.12
21. Id. at 2796.
22. Id. at 2797.
23. Id.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2796.
27. FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Rule 104(a) provides:

Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.
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assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning
28
or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.7
Having made such an assessment, the trial judge must then rule
on whether the testimony, pursuant to Rule 702, would aid the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or establishing a fact in
issue. 29 In making this determination, the trial judge may
consider evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. 30
However, the trial judge is still bound by the Federal Rules on
privileges.31
In New York, the Frye general acceptance test is still the
standard for admissibility of expert scientific testimony. 32 In
People v. Wesley, 33 the New York Court of Appeals recently
affirmed the use of the "general acceptance" standard 34 and, in a
28. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
29. Id.
30. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
31. Id.

32. See People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994) (holding that DNA profiling was "generally accepted" as
reliable by the relevant scientific community and was therefore admissible);
People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 287-88, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135, 552
N.Y.S.2d 883, 887 (1990) (holding the evidence of rape trauma syndrome
admissible because it was generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community).
33. 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994). Here, the
defendant appealed his convictions of murder in the second degree, rape in the
first degree, attempted sodomy in the first degree, and burglary in the second
degree, of a seventy-nine year old woman. Id. at 420, 633 N.E.2d at 453, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 99. The defendant contended that the use of DNA profiling
evidence was not "generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific
community," thus rendering such evidence inadmissible. Id. at 424, 633
N.E.2d at 455, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 101. However, the court ruled to the
contrary, holding that "[t]here was sufficient evidence in the record to support
the hearing court's determination on general reliability as a matter of law and,
second, the determination comported with generally accepted scientific
authority." Id. Thus, "since DNA evidence was found to be generally accepted
as reliable by the relevant scientific community and since a proper foundation
was made at trial, DNA profiling evidence was properly admitted at trial." Id.
at 425, 633 N.E.2d at 455, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
34. Id. at 422-23, 633 N.E.2d at 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
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footnote, rejected the federal application of the Daubert rule. 35
The court stated that the focus of an admissibility inquiry must be
on the acceptance of the reliability of the evidence by the relevant
scientific community, and that such expert testimony based on
scientific principles is admissible "only after the principle or
procedure has gained general acceptance in its specified field." 36
In Wesley, the court held that DNA evidence was "generally
accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community," and,
accordingly, the evidence was properly admitted at trial. 37
The difference between the Frye test as applied in New York
and the Daubert test utilized in federal courts lies in what the
focus of the trial judge is when he or she is determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence. "Fye v. United States poses
the more elemental question of whether the accepted techniques,
when properly performed, generate results accepted as reliable
within the scientific community generally." 3 8 This determination,
which is based solely on the opinion of the relevant scientific
community, is a more stringent test than the flexible approach of
Rule 702.39 The reliability approach of the federal courts does
not reject the general acceptance test per se, but rather rejects it
as the exclusive test and instead only considers it as a factor. 40

35. Id. at 423 n.2, 633 N.E.2d at 454 n.2, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100 n.2.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 422-23, 633 N.E.2d at 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
Id. at 425, 633 N.E.2d at 455, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
Id. at 422, 633 N.E.2d at 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-95.
Id. at 2796-97. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
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